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Abstract
When making decisions that involve tradeoffs between the quality and timing of desirable outcomes, people consis-
tently discount the value of future outcomes. A puzzling finding regarding such decisions is the extremely high rate at
which people discount future monetary outcomes. Most economists would argue that decision-makers should turn down
only rates of return that are lower than those available to them elsewhere. Yet the vast majority of studies find discount
rates that are significantly higher than market interest rates (Frederick et al., 2002). Here we ask whether a lack of
knowledge about the normative strategy can explain high discount rates. In an initial experiment, nearly half of subjects
did not spontaneously cite elements of the normative strategy when asked how people should make intertemporal mon-
etary decisions. In two follow-up experiments, after subjects read a “financial guide” detailing the normative strategy,
discount rates declined by up to 85%, but were still higher than market interest rates. This decline persisted, though
attenuated, for at least one month. In a final experiment, peer-generated advice influenced discount rates in a similar
manner to “expert” advice, and arguments focusing on normative considerations were at least as effective as others.
These studies show that part of the explanation for high discount rates is a lack of knowledge regarding the normative
strategy, and they quantify how much discount rates are reduced in response to normative arguments. Given the high
level of discounting that remains, however, there are other contributing factors to high discount rates that remain to be
quantified.
Keywords: intertemporal choice, behavioral economics, financial education.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Many of the decisions we make involve tradeoffs be-
tween the quality and timing of desirable outcomes. What
should people do when faced with such intertemporal
tradeoffs? Discussions of this question usually focus on
how people should make these tradeoffs (i.e., exponen-
tial vs. hyperbolic discounting), rather than on to what
extent they should discount future rewards. A notable ex-
ception is the case of monetary rewards, where the nor-
mative argument is that individuals should compare any
intertemporal tradeoff against the other borrowing and in-
vestment opportunities available to them.1 In practice,
this argues that the rate of discounting ought to be similar
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1Another notable exception is discussion regarding the normative
discount rate for policy evaluation, particularly in the realm of environ-
mental policy (Baron, 2000; Baron, 2008; Horowitz, 1996; Moore &
Viscusi, 1990).
to the current market interest rate, at least for most indi-
viduals (Fisher, 1930; Read, 2004). For example, con-
sider a person given a choice between receiving a smaller
amount of money at a sooner time and a larger amount
at a later time. If this person could borrow the smaller
amount while waiting for the larger payoff, and if the
larger amount is enough to repay this loan plus interest
and still leave the individual with a profit, then the larger,
later reward is the better choice, regardless of when the
person would want to spend the money.
Most studies of delay discounting, however, have
observed discount rates considerably higher than mar-
ket interest rates (Thaler, 1981; Ainslie & Haslam,
1992; Coller & Williams, 1999; Frederick et al., 2002;
Reynolds, 2006; Chabris et al., 2008). Although most
of these studies involve explicit choices in the labora-
tory between monetary amounts now or in the future,
high discounting rates are also observed in field exper-
iments where normative considerations should be rele-
vant, such as consumers deciding whether to spend ad-
ditional money now on an energy efficient appliance that
will save them money later (Hausman 1979; Ruderman,
Levine, & McMahon, 1987; Gately, 1980). Many studies
cite discount rates in the range of several hundred percent
per year (Frederick et al., 2002 for review). In contrast,
the current prime rate is around 3% (Federal Reserve).
568
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 5, September 2012 Reducing delay discounting 569
This extremely high rate of discounting is puzzling—why
do people appear to diverge so dramatically from the nor-
mative strategy?
There are several possible explanations for the high
discount rates observed in these experiments. One pos-
sibility is that people discount according to the normative
strategy, but also have normatively relevant reasons to fa-
vor the immediate reward. For example, subjects may
think that the delayed reward carries some risk: they may
not trust that they will receive a delayed payment from the
experimenter, or they may believe that their own future is
uncertain. If subjects believe that the delayed reward is
uncertain, this would warrant a greater preference for the
certain immediate payment, and the observed discount
rate would be higher. A different possibility is that there
is a knowledge gap, and that subjects either may be sim-
ply unaware of the normative strategy, or might apply it
to this task incorrectly. Alternatively, people may not per-
ceive that the normative strategy is relevant. For example,
subjects might not think about these tradeoffs in terms of
money, but rather in terms of the objects that could be
purchased with the money (Zauberman & Lynch, 2005).
If they are considering tradeoffs of non-fungible items in-
stead of money, the normative monetary strategy is not
applicable.
Determining what factors contribute to high discount-
ing would have significant practical implications. Policy
makers are often interested in what influences people’s fi-
nancial decisions—for example, what persuades individ-
uals to save more for retirement or to avoid high-interest
“pay-day” loans (Zhong, 1994; Joo & Grable, 2000; Her-
shey & Mowen, 2000; Skiba & Tobacman, 2008). More-
over, high discount rates are also associated with addic-
tion. Cigarette smokers (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2004;
Mitchell, 1999; Bickel et al., 1999), heavy or problem
drinkers (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998; Petry, 2001a), il-
licit drug users (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Kirby et al.,
1999; Madden et al., 1997), and pathological gamblers
(Petry, 2001b) exhibit higher monetary discount rates
than normal healthy adults. A better understanding of
high discount rates might further clarify the link between
discounting and addiction. Information about what influ-
ences discount rates in the laboratory may therefore prove
relevant to a number of issues in public health and policy-
making.
1.2 Summary and main contributions
A set of four experiments was conducted to explore
whether lack of knowledge of the normative strategy
can explain high discount rates. We designed an on-
line survey to poll subjects regarding their reasoning be-
hind intertemporal decisions (Experiment 1), to deter-
mine which of several possible explanations for high dis-
counting are most often mentioned. Although several
of the possibilities mentioned above received some sup-
port, the results implied that a large fraction of subjects
either were unaware of the normative strategy or were
not applying it to the task appropriately. If people are
not considering the normative strategy or are applying it
incorrectly, then providing them with information about
the normative strategy and how to apply it to the task
should reduce discounting. We tested this prediction in
a series of three additional experiments. Experiment 2
tested this hypothesis by providing subjects with a “finan-
cial guide” that explained the normative strategy. To re-
duce any demand effects, the guide emphasized what in-
formation subjects should consider, and explicitly stated
that this information could lead one to be more or less
patient. Providing this information significantly reduced
discounting immediately after the manipulation and for at
least one month, but did not lower discount rates nearly
as far as the normative strategy would prescribe. Exper-
iment 3 tested the effectiveness of a much more strongly
worded version of the financial guide, which reduced dis-
counting further, though still not as low as market inter-
est rates. The failure of even strongly worded normative
arguments to reduce discount rates to the level of mar-
ket interest rates led us to compare normative arguments
to other approaches. In Experiment 4, arguments refer-
encing the normative strategy were at least as effective
as other potential arguments in reducing discount rates.
Since this experiment used short paragraphs written by
other subjects, it also demonstrates that information re-
garding the normative strategy is effective when it does
not come from the experimenter (who was blinded to the
content of the paragraphs) and when it does not reference
“experts”.
Combined, these studies confirm that lack of knowl-
edge about the normative strategy does contribute to high
monetary discounting. Normative arguments reduce dis-
count rates. These interventions produce at least as large
a change in discounting as other previously described ma-
nipulations of the tangibility and perceived distance of fu-
ture timepoints (Peters & Büchel, 2010; Kim, 2010). On
a practical level, our results suggest that education regard-
ing normative considerations should not be dismissed as
being an ineffective way to change financial decision
making. However, our results also contain a puzzle, in
that none of the interventions tested reduced discounting
to the level that the normative strategy would prescribe.
Other factors, such as transaction costs or perceptions of
the future, must also contribute to high discounting, and
further experiments are needed to quantify the contribu-
tion of these other considerations. In terms of practical
implications, simply providing information about norma-
tive considerations alone will not reduce discounting to
normative levels, so future work should investigate com-
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bining multiple arguments, tailoring arguments to indi-
viduals, and other approaches.
2 Experiment 1—Online survey
Several factors might contribute to high levels of mone-
tary discounting. Among them are perceived risk, think-
ing about consumable goods rather than money, and a
lack of understanding of the normative strategy. This
experiment asked subjects to describe what considera-
tions they think are important when making intertempo-
ral choices, to examine which, if any, of these factors are
cited spontaneously.
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Subjects
Individuals recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
completed a short intertemporal choice task on Qualtrics
(Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT) and then responded to
two question prompts. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is
considered a fast and reliable source of experimental data,
with results typically not differing between in-lab and on-
line experiments (Paolacci et al., 2010; Horton & Chilton,
2010; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). We
restricted participation to US-based participants. Of the
151 subjects who began the survey, 93 completed it. Sub-
jects were paid $0.50, and the survey was estimated to
take no longer than 30 minutes.2 The average age of sub-
jects who completed the survey was 32.5 years (SD = 12
years), and 73.6% of subjects were female. All subjects
provided informed consent in accordance with the proce-
dures of the institutional review board at the University
of Pennsylvania.
2.1.2 Procedures
The temporal discounting task consisted of 51 choices.
This task was modeled after the short questionnaire de-
signed by Kirby (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996). Each choice
was between a smaller monetary reward received imme-
diately and a larger monetary reward received after a de-
lay. Choices were presented one at a time. Amounts for
the smaller reward ranged from $10-$34, and amounts for
the larger reward were $25, $30, or $35. Delays ranged
from 1- 180 days. All subjects saw the same choices,
2The payment rate, as presented on the HIT, was $1 per hour. How-
ever, the average response time was 18 minutes, giving an effective rate
of $1.67 per hour. The presented rate of $1 per hour is slightly lower
than the estimated reservation wage ($1.38; Hornton & Chilton, 2010).
The attrition rate in this study (38%) is within the range of attrition
seen in other studies using MTurk (Chandler & Kapelner, 2010; Kelley,
2010; Willett et al., 2012).
though the choices were presented in a different random
order for each subject.
In this experiment, the main variable of interest was not
discount rates but rather the open-ended response ques-
tions. For this reason, subjects were only given a flat
participation payment, and not paid according to their
choices on the discounting questionnaire. In all other ex-
periments, subjects were paid in an incentive-compatible
manner according to one of their choices.
After completing the intertemporal choice task, each
subject answered two questions: (1) “Why did you
choose the way you did?” and (2) “If you had to per-
suade other people to make the same choices that you
just did, what would you say? Include a numerical ex-
ample. Please write a paragraph (8–10 sentences) ex-
plaining your answer. Minimum word count: 180.” Sev-
eral pilot experiments were conducted to determine these
stipulations for the second question, which was designed
to produce lengthy answers containing specific examples,
rather than the brief, vague explanations seen in pilots
2.1.3 Data analysis
Analyses focused on the second question, “If you had to
persuade other people to make the same choices that you
just did, what would you say?” Responses to the first
question, “Why did you make the choices that you did?”
were more likely to involve very specific personal con-
siderations (i.e., receipt dates for paychecks or due bills).
The second question was intentionally framed to produce
general explanations and advice to others.
Responses were scored by 2 individual raters (NS,
TW) on whether the writer mentioned: (1) the risk of
waiting or general uncertainty about the future, (2) pur-
chases or other things the money could be spent on, (3)
the difference in money between the two options (e.g.,
“five more dollars”), (4) the ratio of money in the two
conditions (e.g., “25% more”), and (5) opportunity costs
(e.g., investing, saving, interest rates, and/or the time
value of money). After rating the arguments individually
first, the 2 raters agreed on categorizations by discussing
points of contention.
Discount rates in this experiment were calculated as-
suming an exponential3 discounting model: SV = Ae–kD,
where SV is the subjective value of the delayed option,
3Since the normative strategy involves exponential discounting, we
report the fits from an exponential discount model. However, both hy-
perbolic and exponential models were fit to all data. The hyperbolic
model fit the function: SV = A / (1+k*D) (Mazur, 1987). In this ex-
periment, the fits (r2) of exponential and hyperbolic models were not
significantly different (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p=0.3), and the results
reported in the text did not differ for exponential versus hyperbolic dis-
count rates. Note that the stimuli used were optimized for detecting
differences in the rate of discounting rather than the shape of the dis-
count function, so we refrain from interpreting comparisons between
the fits of the hyperbolic and exponential models.
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Table 1: Survey response category percentages.
Future risk Other purchases Monetarydifferences
Money %s or
ratios
Investing, saving,
etc.
Overall 16% 29% 58% 37% 47%
High discounters 22% 26% 67% 39% 33%
Low discounters 11% 32% 49% 34% 62%
A is the monetary amount of the delayed option, D is the
time delay in days, and k represents the discount rate. A
higher k value indicates steeper discounting of a delayed
reward. Discount rates were estimated using a logistic
regression model, implemented in Matlab (Mathworks,
Natick, MA). In some cases, this regression would not be
well estimated because subjects selected all immediate
or all delayed rewards. To deal with this issue, we deter-
mined the lowest and highest discount rates that we could
reliably estimate, and constrained our estimates to this
range. In this experiment, the discount rates of four sub-
jects were at the lowest extreme of this range, and none
were at the high extreme.
For purposes of comparison, subjects were split at the
median (k=0.0094) into high (n=46) and low (n=47) dis-
counters. The median discount rate was in a reasonable
range compared to in-lab behavioral testing (see Experi-
ments 2, 3, and 4). We compared the percentage of high
and low discounters that mentioned each consideration
using Chi square tests, and also performed a logistic re-
gression of log-transformed discount rates on the likeli-
hood that subjects mentioned each consideration.
2.2 Results
The most frequently recommended strategy (mentioned
by 58% of subjects) was to consider the difference in the
two amounts being offered. Comparatively fewer sub-
jects (37%) recommended that others consider ratios of
amounts. The second highest percentage (47%) of sub-
jects mentioned opportunity costs, such as interest rates
or savings accounts. Of the five categories scored, the
least frequently mentioned factors were the risk inherent
in waiting into the future (16%) and items that could be
purchased (29%).
To examine whether the percentages of subjects rec-
ommending these strategies differed depending on dis-
count rate, subjects were split into two groups at the
median discount rate. The largest difference between
the high and low discounting groups was in mention-
ing opportunity costs, with the low discounting group be-
ing more likely to mention opportunity costs (62%) than
the high discounting group (33%) (Chi square p=0.016).
There was also a trend for the high discounting group
to be more likely to mention considering differences in
amounts (67% vs. 49%, Chi Square p=0.065). Roughly
equal percentages of high and low discounters mentioned
risk, purchases and ratios between amounts (all compar-
isons ns). See Table 1 for all percentages.
A logistic regression was performed to further explore
the relationship between discount rates and the likeli-
hood that subjects would mention each consideration.
There was a significant negative relationship between
log-transformed discount rates and the likelihood of men-
tioning opportunity costs (odds ratio = 0.4, p = 0.004).
There was also a moderately significant positive relation-
ship between discount rates and mentioning future risk
(odds ratio = 2.5, p = 0.051). All other models were
n.s. Those with higher discount rates were therefore less
likely to mention opportunity costs, and more likely to
mention risk inherent in waiting into the future. How-
ever, note that the overall rate of mentioning future risk is
rather low (16% of respondents) compared to opportunity
costs (47% of respondents).
2.3 Discussion
The responses to the online survey support some of the
theoretical explanations for high discounting, but not oth-
ers. First and foremost, we found substantial evidence
that not all subjects consider the normative strategy to
be an important element in intertemporal choices, and
that those who do might be making mistakes in its ap-
plication. If subjects were considering these tradeoffs
normatively by comparing the interest rates available in
the experiment to those available to them on the mar-
ket, they should recommend that others consider relative
percentages or ratios of money rather than differences in
amounts. Yet we found that more subjects mentioned dif-
ferences in monetary amounts than ratios, and that less
than half of responders recommended comparing ratios
at all. Finding that more subjects recommended paying
attention to differences in amounts is in line with recent
descriptive models of intertemporal choice, such as the
tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2006). This model sug-
gests that individuals focus on weighing attribute differ-
ences (i.e., amount or delay) between the choice options,
rather than comparing their overall values.
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Furthermore, if subjects were considering these trade-
offs normatively, they should mention opportunity costs.
While many subjects did mention opportunity costs, there
was still a considerable proportion (53%) who did not
recommend considering the key element from a norma-
tive point of view. Opportunity costs was the category
that differed most clearly between patient and impatient
subjects. Patient subjects were more likely to recom-
mend that others consider opportunity costs than those
who were relatively impatient, with 62% of patient sub-
jects mentioning opportunity costs and only 33% of im-
patient subjects doing so. This suggests that those who
exhibit higher discount rates may be less aware of nor-
mative considerations.
In addition, the percentage of high discounting respon-
ders (33%) that mentioned opportunity costs suggests that
these responders might not have considered opportunity
costs accurately. This was directly evident in some in-
dividuals’ responses. For example, one subject stated,
“Would you rather have $19 now or $23 in 55 days. It’s
pretty simple. Why would I wait almost 2 months more
for 4 extra dollars? I could make more money with the
$19 now and turn it into a profit by using it for something
else to invest in.” In this case, a 141% annual interest rate
was implied. Since such rates of return are unlikely, es-
pecially for any large percentage of the population in the
US, these statements suggest that some subjects were not
accurately calculating interest rates. This raises another
possible factor contributing to high discounting, which is
that even when people are aware of normative considera-
tions, they may not be able to apply them correctly to the
task at hand.
These findings regarding the importance of knowl-
edge about normative considerations are potentially re-
lated to individual differences in discounting. While the
associations between discounting and personality traits
are generally low, stronger correlations have been found
between discounting and cognitive ability (Shamosh &
Gray, 2008; Hirsh et al., 2008; Burks et al., 2009).
One potential explanation for this association involves
the awareness of and ability to implement the normative
strategy. Individuals of higher cognitive ability may be
more likely to be exposed to normative arguments about
opportunity costs, for example through schooling, and
may be better able to accurately calculate interest rates
in order to apply normative considerations correctly.
In contrast to the above findings, we did not find as
strong evidence for two alternative hypotheses about the
explanation for high discounting: that subjects were con-
cerned about the risk or uncertainty involved in a delayed
payment or that subjects were considering consumable
goods—items that could be purchased with the money
rather than the money itself. Although there is a positive
relationship between discount rates and the likelihood of
mentioning risk, only a minority of subjects mentioned
risk as a consideration.
One limitation of this experiment is that the question
we asked subjects, “if you had to persuade other peo-
ple to make the same choices that you just did, what
would you say,” might not provide the most accurate pic-
ture regarding the reasons subjects made the choices they
did, especially if subjects do not have conscious access
to the reasons for their choices. This question does pro-
vide an accurate picture of what subjects consider com-
pelling arguments, since subjects’ explicit goal was to be
persuasive. In this respect, it is interesting that opportu-
nity costs, which are normatively relevant, are the factors
mentioned most often in favor of low discounting. We
designed the next experiment to see whether exposure to
this argument can reduce discount rates.
3 Experiment 2—Financial guide
and interest rate instruction ses-
sion
If lack of knowledge is an important contributor to high
discount rates, explicitly informing subjects about the
normative argument should reduce discounting. In Ex-
periment 2, some subjects were asked to read a “financial
guide,” which explained what information people should
consider normatively. This guide focused on what infor-
mation people should consider, specifically opportunity
costs, rather than on what they should choose. It pro-
vided examples where these considerations would war-
rant more choices of the delayed reward and examples
where these considerations would warrant fewer choices
of the delayed reward, so as to not directly imply that sub-
jects should become either more or less impatient. To ad-
dress the possibility that subjects might already know this
information but mistakenly underestimate the returns of-
fered in the experiment, some subjects viewed examples
of the interest rates implied between choice options. The
effects of the guide and the interest-rate examples were
examined individually and together, in a 2x2 design.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Subjects
Eighty individuals from the University of Pennsylvania
community participated in this experiment, with 20 indi-
viduals in each of 4 experimental conditions. The mean
age was 22.2 years (SD=5.3 years), and 66% of sub-
jects were female. Students made up 80% of the sub-
ject pool; 17.5% of subjects were employed full-time and
2.5% were unemployed. All subjects provided written in-
formed consent in accordance with the procedures of the
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institutional review board at the University of Pennsylva-
nia.
All subjects were asked to return about one month after
their first session for a second session. Of the original 80
subjects, 70 (mean age = 22.3 years, SD=5.5 years; 69%
female; 84% students, 16% employed) were willing to
return for a second session roughly one month after the
first (average delay = 30 days, SD=5.1 days).
3.1.2 Intertemporal choice task
The temporal discounting task consisted of 102 choices.
Subjects completed the task 3 times (two sets at the first
session, and one set at the second session), with new
choices each time. The task was presented in E-Prime
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), but was
otherwise as described in Experiment 1.
At each session, subjects were informed that they
would be paid according to their choice on one ran-
domly selected trial, in addition to a show-up payment
of $10. Subjects received payments via debit card (Kable
& Glimcher, 2007, 2010) regardless of whether the ran-
domly selected trial involved an immediate or delayed
payment. For delayed payments, the incentive payment
did not become available on the card until after the delay
period.
At session 1, 37.5% of payments were immediate, and
the average immediate payment was $23.36. The average
delayed payment was $29.47, and the average delay was
26 days. At session 2, 51.25% of payments were imme-
diate, and the average immediate payment was $25.54.
The average delayed payment was $30, and the average
delay was 30 days. By the date of their second appoint-
ment, 89% of subjects had already received an incentive
payment from the experimenter. Whether or not a pay-
ment had been successfully received before the second
appointment did not affect the degree of change in dis-
count rates (see below).
3.1.3 Procedures
At session 1, subjects first completed 2 practice trials, fol-
lowed by 102 trials of the intertemporal choice task. Af-
ter completing this first set of choices, subjects underwent
one of the four experimental manipulations and then im-
mediately completed the second set of 102 choice trials.
At session 2, approximately one month later, subjects re-
turned to the lab and completed the third set of 102 choice
trials. The second session was run by a different exper-
imenter, and no mention was made of the manipulation
seen at the first appointment. Discount rates were calcu-
lated separately for each 102-item set.
3.1.4 Financial guide
The financial guide outlined in detail the elements of the
normative decision strategy, but did not explicitly recom-
mend that subjects become more or less impatient. The
key aspect of the normative strategy is that the subject
should not turn down a rate-of-return from the experi-
menter that outperforms what the subject could achieve
outside of the experiment. The text emphasized that
choosing in accordance with the normative strategy does
not require changing one’s preferences regarding con-
sumption. Subjects could “have it both ways,” such that if
they strongly preferred to spend the smaller amount im-
mediately, they could borrow that amount from another
source while waiting for the larger amount, and might
be able to make a profit after repaying the loan. If they
could do so, then the larger, delayed option would be
the better choice regardless of their preferences regard-
ing consumption. Alternatively, if subjects would prefer
to make the most money possible, they should consider
whether investing the amount of money available imme-
diately would yield a higher amount at the end of the de-
lay period than the delayed option offers. If their potential
investment would be worth more than the delayed option,
then the immediate option would be the better choice.
To aid in comparison, a figure included in the guide il-
lustrated the increasing value of money when invested
at several different interest rates (or, comparably, the in-
creasing amount owed after borrowing money at several
different interest rates).
The guide also emphasized that the normative strategy
depends on individual circumstances. Some subjects may
not have a credit card, an interest-bearing bank account,
or other convenient ways to borrow and invest money.
If subjects prefer having money to spend today, and do
not have other borrowing opportunities, then they might
justifiably accept a smaller, immediate option that others
with borrowing opportunities would reject. Similarly, if
they prefer a larger amount of money, but do not have
any investment opportunities, then they might justifiably
accept a larger, later payment that others with investment
opportunities would reject.
See the Appendix for the full guide.
3.1.5 APR manipulation / interest rate instruction
For the APR (annual percentage rate) manipulation, sub-
jects first read a short definition of APR. They then were
presented with 51 choice pairs that they had previously
seen. For each pair, subjects were presented with the
original choice options, the implied interest rate (APR)
between them, and the option they had chosen previously.
Subjects were not given the opportunity to change their
choices, but were asked to simply pay attention to the
screen. The APRs ranged from 7% to 9000%.
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3.1.6 Data analysis
Discount rates were estimated separately for each set of
questions, and calculated as in Experiment 1.4 Two sub-
jects had discount rates estimated at the lower bound of
the range, and none at the upper bound. Because dis-
count rates are not normally distributed, all statistics in
this experiment were performed on the log-transform of
the discount parameter k. The average discount rates re-
ported are transforms of the mean log discount rate. Error
bars in Figure 1 are calculated as within-subject standard
error, as in Morey (2008).
Because of the large variability in discount rates across
the population, between-group differences are difficult to
detect. There was not a between-treatments difference in
discount rates in this experiment. A multivariate ANOVA
on each timepoint showed a nonsignificant effect of the
guide at both timepoints after the manipulations (imme-
diately after, F(1,69) = 0.504, p = 0.48; one month later,
F(1,69) = 1.785, p = 0.186). However, discount rates
within subjects are very reliable without intervention (see
test-retest reliability below), so within-subject analyses
are both justified and more powerful. Analyses of this
experiment and those following will use within-subject
comparisons.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Session 1
The four different experimental conditions were (1) read-
ing the financial guide alone (“Guide”); (2) reading
the financial guide and viewing the APR manipula-
tion (“Guide+APR”); (3) viewing the APR manipulation
alone (“APR”); and (4) viewing neither the guide nor the
APR manipulation (“control”). At session 1, subjects in
all conditions performed the delay discounting task twice.
A repeated measures ANOVA used the log transform
of discount rates as the dependent variable, the first
and second choice sets as the within-subjects factor, and
dummy variables coding whether subjects saw the finan-
cial guide and the APR manipulation as between-subjects
factors. The results indicated a significant 2-way inter-
action between choice sets and exposure to the financial
guide (F(1,76)=10.707, p=0.002). There was not a signif-
icant 2-way interaction between choice sets and exposure
to the APR manipulation (F(1,76)=0.004, p=0.947), or
a significant 3-way interaction between choice sets, ex-
posure to the financial guide, and exposure to the APR
4Except for the first and third timepoints of the guide only and con-
trol conditions, the exponential discounting model provided a signifi-
cantly better fit than the hyperbolic model (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p
< 0.05). The results reported in the text do not differ for exponential
versus hyperbolic discount rates.
Figure 1: Discount rates before and after reading finan-
cial guide. Average discount rates (on log scale) at each
of three timepoints, grouped by whether or not subjects
read the financial guide. Error bars are calculated for
the within-subject comparison, as described by Morey
(2008).
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manipulation (F(1,76)=0.371, p=0.545). Thus, only the
financial guide had a significant impact on behavior.
Because we did not observe a significant effect of the
APR manipulation, the four manipulations are collapsed
into two groups below. The subjects who read the fi-
nancial guide showed a significant reduction in discount
rates, moving from a mean of k=0.0093 to k=0.0061 (t-
test on log transform, p<0.0001). Those who did not read
the guide showed no significant change in discount rates,
with the mean moving from k=0.0074 to k=0.0071 (t-test
on log transform, p=0.44).
Since subjects in the control condition did not see ei-
ther manipulation, we were able to obtain a measure of
the test-retest reliability of our task. Discount rates did
not change significantly in this condition, with the aver-
age for the first test at k=0.0054 and for the second test
at k=0.0050 (t-test on log transform, p=0.84). Test-retest
reliability, measured as the correlation between the log-
transformed discount rates at the two tests, was 0.956.
This demonstrates that, without intervention, discount
rates in this task are consistent within individuals, on a
given day.
3.2.2 Session 2—One month later
All subjects in Experiment 2 were asked to return roughly
one month after the first appointment. At this time, they
completed the delay discounting task with a different ex-
perimenter, with no mention made of their previous ap-
pointment. Of the 20 subjects in each condition, the fol-
lowing numbers returned one month later: 16 from the
Guide condition; 20 from the Guide+APR condition; 16
from the APR condition; and 18 from the Control condi-
tion.
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A repeated measures ANOVA used the log-
transformed discount rates as the dependent variable,
the three choice sets as the within-subjects factor, and
dummy variables coding exposure to the financial guide
and APR manipulation as between-subjects factors.
The results indicated a significant 2-way interaction
between choice sets and exposure to the financial guide
(F(2,132)=9.303, p=0.001). There was no significant
2-way interaction between choice sets and exposure
to the APR manipulation (F(2,132)=0.222, p=0.75), or
3-way interaction between choice sets, exposure to the
financial guide and exposure to the APR manipulation
(F(2,132)=0.117, p=0.844).
Again, because we did not observe a significant effect
of the APR manipulation, the four manipulations are col-
lapsed into two groups below. For subjects who read the
financial guide at the first appointment, the average dis-
count rate decreased immediately after the manipulation.
One month later, the average discount rate showed a non-
significant increase relative to immediately after reading
the guide (from k=0.0061 immediately after to k=0.0072
one month later; t-test on log transform, p=0.147) and re-
mained significantly lower than before reading the guide
(from k=0.0093 before to k=0.0072 one month later; t-
test on log transform, p=0.032). This demonstrates that
there was an effect of the financial guide that lasted for
at least one month. Although there was a trend for some
rebound in discount rates one month after the manipula-
tion, discount rates were still significantly lower than at
the first, naïve test. See Figure 1 for average discount
rates across time.
We also observed higher discount rates one month later
in subjects who did not receive the financial guide, rela-
tive to the second test (t-test on log transform, p=0.002).
This was not attributable to whether subjects had received
immediate or delayed payments from session 1. Exam-
ined across all subjects, payment category (immediate
payment or delayed payment received before second ses-
sion, vs. delayed payment received after second session)
did not have a significant effect on the degree of change
in discount rates (difference in log k) from sets 2 to 3
(ANOVA, F(2,69)=1.556, p=0.217) or from sets 1 to 3
(ANOVA, F(2,69)=0.591, p=0.445). The significant re-
duction of discounting that we observed in subjects who
did read the guide was in the opposite direction of the
drift observed in those who did not read the guide, so if
anything, this finding suggests that the above results un-
derestimate the effects of the guide.
3.3 Discussion
This experiment used a 2x2 design to examine the effects
of providing information regarding the normative strat-
egy (the financial guide) and the implied interest rates in
the choices the subjects face (the APR manipulation). If
subjects discount highly because they are unaware of the
normative strategy, reading the financial guide should re-
duce discounting. Results from this experiment indicate
that this is in fact true for many subjects. Subjects who
read the guide exhibited a significant 35% reduction in
discounting. This effect lasted at least one month, with
discount rates remaining 23% lower one month later.
Viewing the APR manipulation did not have a signif-
icant effect on discounting. It could be that the infor-
mation in the guide provided enough clarification about
interest rates for any subjects who were unclear, and that
viewing the APR manipulation alone was not enough in-
formation to change behavior. Our results suggest that
misunderstanding interest rate calculations was not a ma-
jor contributor to high discount rates in this experiment.
Although the financial guide reduced discounting sig-
nificantly, it did not lower discount rates nearly as far as
the normative strategy would prescribe. The average dis-
count rate of the subjects who read the financial guide was
equivalent to an annual interest rate of about 320%. How-
ever, the financial guide employed a neutral tone and pro-
vided no general recommendation that subjects become
more or less impatient. This neutral wording was used
to eliminate any possibility of experimenter demand ef-
fects, but it might also have obscured an understanding
of the normative argument. To rule out the possibility
that the extremely high discount rates that remain in this
experiment are due to people still not fully understanding
the normative argument or its implications, we performed
the next experiment, which used a very strongly worded
guide that makes explicit recommendations for what to
choose.
4 Experiment 3—Prescriptive fi-
nancial guide
In this experiment, we tested whether a more strongly
worded argument could reduce discounting further than
the manipulations described in Experiment 2. Here the
guide emphasized that, because most delayed choices
yield very high rates of return and most subjects do have
flexible financial opportunities, the normative strategy, in
the case of the choice options presented here, is to almost
always choose the delayed reward. We were interested
in whether or not, when the argument is put in strongest
possible terms, people would reduce their discounting to
the level of market interest rates.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 5, September 2012 Reducing delay discounting 576
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Subjects
Twenty individuals from the University of Pennsylvania
and surrounding community participated (75% female;
70% students, 20% employed, 10% unemployed). The
mean age was 26 years (SD = 10.7). All subjects were
asked to return roughly one month after their first ap-
pointment for a second session. Of the original 20 sub-
jects, 17 (82% female; 76% students, 12% employed,
12% unemployed; mean age 26, SD = 11.6) were willing
to return for a second session (average delay = 30 days,
SD = 6 days). All subjects provided written informed
consent in accordance with the procedures of the institu-
tional review board at the University of Pennsylvania.
4.1.2 Intertemporal choice task
The temporal discounting task consisted of 51 choices.
Subjects completed the task 3 times (two sets at the first
session, and one set at the second session). The partic-
ulars of the task and payment are otherwise identical to
Experiment 2.
At session 1, the average payment was $27.45. Forty-
five percent of these payments were immediate (average
$25.44) and 55% were delayed (average $29.09). For de-
layed payments, the average delay was 53.5 days. At ses-
sion 2, the average payment was $25.18. Thirty-five per-
cent of those payments were immediate (average $18.60)
and 65% were delayed (average $31.00). For delayed
payments, the average delay was 53.2 days.
4.1.3 Procedures
Subjects first completed 2 practice trials, followed by 51
trials of the intertemporal choice task. Then subjects read
the financial guide and immediately afterward completed
the second set of 51 intertemporal choices. One month
later, subjects returned to complete the third set of 51 in-
tertemporal choices. This session was run by a different
experimenter, with no mention made of the guide read at
the previous session. Discount rates were calculated sep-
arately for each set of 51 trials.
4.1.4 Financial guide
Like the financial guide used in Experiment 2, this guide
outlined in detail the normative decision strategy, that
subjects should not turn down a rate-of-return from the
experimenter that outperformed what they could obtain
outside the experiment. The guide also presented scenar-
ios that allowed the subject to “have it both ways,” mak-
ing the most profit from the experiment while still spend-
ing or saving money according to their personal prefer-
ences.
However, unlike the balanced argument in Experiment
2, which emphasized that the normative strategy could
lead to different subjects making different decisions in
this task, the guide in this experiment strongly empha-
sized that in most cases, the normative strategy would
lead subjects to make more patient choices. The guide
pointed out that because most of the larger, delayed op-
tions in this experiment yielded very high returns, the
best strategy was almost always to choose the delayed
option. The guide explained that, since the rate of return
from most of the choices in the experiment was higher
than what is available on the market, a simple way to
implement the “best strategy” was to always accept the
larger amount of money. It then described the more so-
phisticated approach of comparing subjects’ own borrow-
ing and investment opportunities to the interest rates of-
fered in the experiment. Assuming that all subjects had
such financial opportunities, the larger, later option was
almost always the more valuable choice given the range
of options offered in these experiments. For example, if
subjects chose all delayed options offering an annual rate
of return greater than the current prime rate (3%), they
would select the delayed option 100% of the time in this
experiment. Even if subjects chose the delayed option
only when it offered a rate of return greater than 20%,
they would still select the delayed option 82% of the time
in this experiment.
This presentation of the normative strategy did make
some generalizations, both about the choices offered (that
they had high returns) and about the personal finances of
the subjects. In some ways, then, it may not have been the
fairest representation of the normative argument. How-
ever, since the goal of this experiment was to test for the
strongest possible effect, we erred on the side of overstat-
ing the normative argument.
See the Appendix for the full guide.
4.1.5 Data analysis
Discount rates in this experiment were calculated as in
Experiment 1.5 Three subjects had discount rates esti-
mated at the lower bound of the range, and none at the
upper bound. Again, statistical analyses were performed
on the log-transformed discount rate, and the average dis-
count rates reported are transforms of the mean log dis-
count rate. Error bars in Figure 2 are calculated as within-
subject standard error, as in Morey (2008).
5There were no significant differences between fit of the exponential
and hyperbolic models in this experiment (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, all
p > 0.3), and the results reported in the text do not depend on whether
exponential or hyperbolic rates are used.
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Figure 2: Discount rates before and after reading pre-
scriptive financial guide. Average discount rates (on log
scale) at each of three timepoints. Error bars are calcu-
lated for the within-subject comparison, as described by
Morey (2008).
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Session 1
Discount rates (k) were calculated for each subject (n=20)
from choices before and immediately after reading the
guide at session 1. There was an 85% decrease in dis-
count rates after reading the guide (t-test on log trans-
form, p<0.0002). The average discount rate declined
from k = 0.0080 to k = 0.0012. Discount rates did not
cluster around the discount rate illustrated in the guide (k
= 0.0005), suggesting that overall, subjects did not simply
implement the illustrated decision rule. Very few subjects
(n = 2) selected all the delayed options immediately after
reading the guide,6 suggesting that subjects also did not
follow the simpler version of the decision rule put forth
in the guide, which was to always take the larger amount
of money.
4.2.2 Session 2—One month later
Subjects were asked to return roughly one month after
their first session and were tested by a different experi-
menter, with no reminder of the guide read at session 1.
For these subjects (n=17), discount rates were calculated
from choices on the third set of discounting questions
and compared to the two sets from the first session. A
repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant change
in discount rates over time (F(2,32)=16.46, p<0.0001).
The average discount rate at the second session, ap-
proximately one month after reading the guide, was k =
0.0030. This discount rate was significantly higher than
immediately after reading the guide (k = 0.0012; t-test on
log transform, p=0.009). However, this discount rate was
6A third subject chose all delayed options only at the one-month
timepoint.
also significantly lower than before any intervention (k =
0.0080; t-test on log transform, p=0.013). Thus, although
subjects were steeper discounters one month after reading
the guide, they still discounted significantly less than be-
fore reading the guide. See Figure 2 for average discount
rates over time.
4.3 Discussion
When subjects read a financial guide including not only
an explanation of the normative strategy but also spe-
cific recommendations to choose more delayed options,
we observed an even stronger immediate reduction in dis-
count rates. There was an 85% decrease in discount rates
in Experiment 3, compared to a 35% decrease in Experi-
ment 2. As seen in Experiment 2, the effect of the finan-
cial guide persisted for at least one month; discount rates
remained significantly lower at the one-month timepoint
than at the original test.
Interestingly, the rebound in discount rates from im-
mediately after reading the guide to one month later was
reliable in this experiment, whereas it was not reliable
in Experiment 2. This difference in the degree of re-
bound is significant (repeated-measures ANOVA with
discount rates as within-subjects factor and experiment as
between-subjects factor; F(1,51)=10.69, p=0.002). One
possibility is that the larger decline in discount rates in
this experiment provides more opportunity for discount
rates to rebound. Another possibility is that the guide
used in this experiment induced strong experimenter de-
mand effects, which account for much of the larger ob-
served decline in discount rates, and that the rebound in
discount rates one month later reflects the reduction of
these effects with a new experimenter.
The observed reduction in discount rates did not oc-
cur because subjects chose to follow either of the sug-
gested decision rules. The financial guide suggested that
the “simplest version of the best strategy” was to always
choose the larger, later option. However, very few sub-
jects (2 out of 20) adopted this strategy after reading the
guide; nearly all continued to select a mixture of imme-
diate and delayed rewards. The guide also described an
implementation of the “sophisticated version of the best
strategy,” assuming a 20% annual interest rate. Again,
there was no clustering of subjects around this discount
rate.
Immediately after reading the guide, the average dis-
count rate was equivalent to an APR of about 48%. This
APR is not completely outside a reasonable realm: taking
into account possible penalties and late fees, the interest
rate on a credit card could approach this level. However,
this APR is not as low as typical market interest rates.
Even with a very strongly worded, clear, and understand-
able argument for the normative strategy, and the possible
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presence of demand effects, the average individual still
did not shift to discount at the level of typical market in-
terest rates.
These results show that normative arguments, while ef-
fective, still do not lead people to discount at the level of
market interest rates. This raises the question of whether
normative arguments are more or less effective at chang-
ing discounting than other possible arguments. We con-
ducted the next experiment to begin exploring this ques-
tion. We also manipulated the source and framing of the
arguments presented, to test whether information needs
to come from an authority to be effective.
5 Experiment 4—Peer-generated
advice
Experiment 4 examined whether the source and fram-
ing of information presented affected discount rates. In
contrast to the materials presented in Experiments 2 and
3, the advice presented to subjects in Experiment 4 was
written by other subjects, rather than by the experimenter.
These paragraphs varied on two dimensions—whether
they encouraged subjects to be more patient or more im-
patient (argument type), and the content of the argument.
Two arguments (one patient, one impatient) relied on rea-
soning about financial opportunity costs, as required by
the normative strategy, while two arguments encouraged
subjects to engage in episodic future thought and imagine
how they might use the money now or in the future.
5.1 Methods
5.1.1 Subjects
Sixty-four individuals from the University of Pennsylva-
nia and the surrounding community participated in this
study, with 16 people in each of the four experimental
conditions. The mean age was 21 years (SD=2.17 years)
and 62.5% of the subjects were female. The majority
of the subjects (91%) were students, with the remaining
individuals being either employed full-time (6%) or un-
employed (3%). All subjects provided written informed
consent in accordance with the procedures of the human
subjects review board at the University of Pennsylvania.
Each subject received a set show-up payment of either
$5 or $10, depending on whether they participated only
in this 30 min. study (44% of subjects) or this study and
an additional, unrelated 30 min. study. Additional win-
nings were then determined based on subject’s responses
in the choice trials. Seventy percent of the payments
were immediate, with the average immediate reward be-
ing $24.36. The other thirty percent of the payments were
delayed, with an average delayed reward of $28.95 and an
average delay of 45 days.
5.1.2 Procedures
The task and payment details are as described in Experi-
ment 3. Subjects completed two practice trials, followed
by 51 intertemporal choice trials. They saw one of four
experimental manipulations, and then completed the sec-
ond set of 51 choice trials. All four experimental manip-
ulations required subjects to read one of the four peer-
generated paragraphs, selected at random (experimenter
blinded), and then to rate the paragraph’s persuasiveness
and helpfulness (five-point scale, with 1 being not persua-
sive/helpful and 5 being extremely persuasive/helpful).
Subjects were told that after completing some monetary
decisions, they would be viewing one of several possi-
ble paragraphs that were written by other people who had
completed the same experiment. They were asked to read
the paragraph carefully, as they would be asked to rate
the persuasiveness and helpfulness of the paragraph later.
They were also informed that the experimenter did not
know which of the paragraphs they would be reading.
5.1.3 Peer-generated advice paragraphs
The paragraphs were taken from subjects’ responses to
the second question in Experiment 1, “If you had to per-
suade other people to make the same choices that you just
did, what would you say?” The list of 93 original argu-
ments was narrowed down to 44 paragraphs by selecting
the strongest and most coherent arguments. An additional
8 paragraphs were taken from a similar survey of Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania students enrolled at the Wharton
school. These 52 paragraphs were then rated by another
set of 278 subjects through online surveys; 170 subjects
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and
108 from the University of Pennsylvania’s psychology
department subject pool. The survey asked subjects to
complete a short delay discounting task and then to read
ten randomly selected paragraphs, and (1) indicate if the
paragraph would have made them more likely to take the
“now” option (i.e. more impatient), the “later” option (i.e.
more patient), or neither, and (2) rate the strength of the
argument from 1 to 5 (5 being the strongest).
The arguments that received the highest ratings were
then sorted according to whether they advised patience
or impatience, and by whether they utilized primarily fi-
nancial reasoning or prospective thought. For example,
the “impatient prospective” paragraph includes, “Imag-
ine that you are worried about paying your electric bill,
the baby sitter, the dentist for your child. The economy
is tanking, half your peers have lost their jobs this month.
. . . A smaller amount of money given today. . . provides
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Figure 3: Discount rates after reading peer-generated ad-
vice. Average discount rates (on log scale) grouped by
content and type of advice paragraph read. Error bars
are calculated for the within-subject comparison, as de-
scribed by Morey (2008).
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a financial cushion and a margin of security.” The “pa-
tient financial” paragraph includes, “I know the numbers
are small, but think about it this way — would you rather
have $20,000 today or $22,000 three months from now?
. . . If you annualize the return, that would be a 40% re-
turn per year! If you took the $20,000 today and put it
in a savings account, (earning about 1%) in three months
you would only have $20,050. The difference is $1950!”
See Appendix for the full paragraphs.
The four experimental conditions were paragraphs that
encouraged patience using predominantly prospective
thought (patient-prospective), encouraged patience using
financial reasoning (patient-financial), encouraged impa-
tience using prospective thought (impatient-prospective),
and encouraged impatience using financial reasoning
(impatient-financial). One of the highest-rated para-
graphs was chosen from each condition, such that the
final 4 paragraphs did not significantly differ on argu-
ment strength in the initial rating surveys. The lengths
of the paragraphs were also roughly equal, from 193 to
233 words.
5.1.4 Data analysis
Discount rates were estimated separately for each set of
questions, and calculated as in Experiment 1.7 In this ex-
periment one subject was at the upper bound and one at
the lower bound of the estimation range. As above, sta-
tistical analyses were performed on the log-transformed
7Exponential and hyperbolic fits did not differ at the first mea-
surement of this experiment (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p = 0.98), but
exponential fits were significantly better at the second measurement
(Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p=0.002). In this case, all the results reported
in the text but one do not depend on which model is used. The exception
is the analysis of change in the group viewing “impatient” arguments,
as noted in footnote 8.
discount rate, and the average discount rates reported are
transforms of the mean log discount rate. Error bars in
Figure 3 are calculated as within-subject standard error,
as in Morey (2008).
As in Experiment 2, a between-groups ANOVA was
conducted on discount rates immediately following the
manipulation. In this experiment, there is a significant
group effect of argument type (F(1,64)=7.124, p=0.01);
after the manipulation, subjects who read the patient
paragraphs were significantly more patient than those
who read the impatient paragraphs. There was no
significant effect of argument content (F(1,64)=0.323,
p=0.572), or an interaction (F(1,64)=0, p=0.99). How-
ever, as discussed in Experiment 2, within-subject analy-
ses of discount rates are both justified and more powerful,
and are therefore the focus of the results section below.
5.2 Results
Subjects in all conditions performed the delay discount-
ing task twice. After completing the task once, subjects
read one of the four peer-generated paragraphs, rated
the paragraph on its persuasiveness and helpfulness, and
then completed the task a second time. A repeated-
measures ANOVA using the log transform of discount
rates from the first and second set as the within-subjects
factor and the argument type (patient or impatient) and
content (financial reasoning or prospective thought) as
between-subjects factors indicated a significant relation-
ship between discount rate tests and the patience condi-
tion (F(1,60)=23.8; p<0.0001). The average discount rate
of subjects viewing patient arguments decreased from
k=0.0111 to k=0.0056 (t-test on log k, p<0.0001), while
the discount rates of subjects viewing impatient argu-
ments increased, although less reliably, from k=0.0126
to k=0.0153 (t-test on log k, p=0.057).8 There was no
significant effect of argument content (F(1,60)=0.717,
p=0.401), and no significant interaction between argu-
ment type and content (F(1,60)=0.463, p=0.5).
The analysis above indicates that the argument type
(patient or impatient) did have a significant effect on be-
havior, but does not ask whether patient or impatient ar-
guments were more effective. To address this, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was performed using adjusted log-
transformed discount rates, such that change in discount
rates was signed in the same direction for the patient and
impatient conditions. Because this analysis is done on
log-transformed discount rates, these discount rates and
changes are normally distributed. The within-subjects
variable was the adjusted discount rate, and the between-
subjects variables were the argument type and content
conditions. There was a significant effect of argument
8Using hyperbolic fits, this increase in discount rates for impatient
arguments does reach significance at p=0.02.
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Table 2: Average argument ratings.
Persuasiveness Helpfulness
Patient-financial 2.69 (SD=0.70) 2.88 (SD=0.96)
Patient-prospective 3.31 (SD=1.01) 2.44 (SD=1.15)
Impatient-financial 3.75 (SD=0.86) 3.31 (SD=1.01)
Impatient-prospective 4.31 (SD=0.60) 3.00 (SD=0.82)
type (F(1,60)=7.517, p=0.008), with those in the pa-
tient condition having a larger change in discount rates
than those in the impatient condition. There was no ef-
fect of argument content (F(1,60)=0.463, p=0.5), and no
significant interaction between argument type and con-
tent (F(1,60)=0.717, p=0.401). The patient paragraphs,
then, changed behavior more drastically than the impa-
tient paragraphs, but the degree of change was not af-
fected by the content of the argument.
To examine whether argument conditions affected per-
suasiveness and helpfulness ratings differently, a multi-
variate ANOVA was performed using argument type and
content as between-subjects factors. The average per-
suasiveness and helpfulness ratings are in Table 2. The
ANOVA indicated a significant effect of argument type
on persuasiveness ratings (F(1,63)=25.97, p<0.0001) and
a moderately significant effect on helpfulness ratings
(F(1,63)=4.059, p=0.048), with “impatient” paragraphs
being rated as more persuasive and helpful than “patient”
paragraphs. There was also a significant effect of content
type on persuasiveness ratings (F(1,63)=8.609, p=0.005),
with “prospective” paragraphs being rated as more per-
suasive than “financial” paragraphs, but not on helpful-
ness ratings (F(1,63)=2.283, p=0.136). There was no
significant interaction between ratings, argument type,
and argument content for persuasiveness (F(1,63)=0.024,
p=0.878) or helpfulness (F(1,63)=0.063, p=0.802). Aver-
age ratings can be found in Table 2.
Persuasiveness ratings were not significantly corre-
lated with the absolute percent change in discount rates
(r=0.136, one-tailed p=0.142), though helpfulness ratings
were (r=0.277, one-tailed p=0.013).
5.3 Discussion
In Experiment 4, we asked whether peer-generated advice
could change discount rates. Subjects read advice that
suggested patience or impatience, and utilized financial
reasoning or prospective thought. We observed that dis-
count rates could be significantly increased or decreased
depending on the type of advice (patient or impatient)
read. This was true for subjects who read either advice
emphasizing financial reasoning or advice emphasizing
prospective thought.
The reduction in discounting resulting from peer ad-
vice emphasizing financial reasons for patience was of
comparable size to the reduction observed in Experiment
2, which utilized a neutral presentation of the normative
strategy. The effects seen in our previous experiments,
then, do not depend either on the source of the advice
or on the particulars of the message. The financial rea-
soning paragraphs used here conceptually resembled the
normative argument as presented in Experiments 2 and 3,
but did not include all the particulars. Presenting some
elements of the normative strategy in the form of advice
from others is enough to reduce discounting. Again, how-
ever, normative arguments do not reduce discounting to
anything near the level of market interest rates.
Interestingly, patient advice emphasizing financial
reasoning and patient advice emphasizing prospective
thought reduced discounting to a similar degree. Fur-
ther experiments could utilize more than one exemplar for
each category, to confirm these observed differences, or
lack thereof, between advice types. Although the advice
emphasizing financial reasoning and normative consider-
ations was rated least persuasive, it was not any less ef-
fective than the advice relying prospective thought. This
is noteworthy, given that opinions about the efficacy of
normative instruction are often pessimistic.
We were able to shift discount rates not only towards
increased patience, but also towards increased impa-
tience. In the impatient condition, as well as in the pa-
tient condition, there was no difference between the sub-
jects who read paragraphs using financial reasoning and
paragraphs relying on prospective thought. The fact that
advice mentioning financial opportunity costs had the po-
tential to increase discount rates, and to do so with equal
effectiveness to advice relying on prospective thought,
highlights the fragility of people’s understanding of the
normative strategy.
However, we did observe that the “patient” paragraphs
caused significantly greater change in discount rates than
the “impatient” paragraphs (50%, compared to 21%).
This is despite the fact that the patient arguments were
rated as less persuasive and less helpful than the impatient
arguments. It thus appears that, although impatient argu-
ments are effective at changing behavior and are rated as
more persuasive and helpful, patient arguments are still
significantly more effective in changing behavior.
6 General discussion
In experimental studies of intertemporal choice, people
generally discount the value of monetary rewards at a rate
that far exceeds the market interest rate (Frederick et al.,
2002; Reynolds et al., 2006). This set of experiments
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shows that one important factor contributing to high rates
of discounting is a lack of understanding of the norma-
tive strategy, and that providing information regarding the
normative strategy results in sustained reductions in dis-
counting. These experiments also demonstrate that pro-
viding such information is not enough to reduce discount-
ing to levels near those of market interest rates. Below we
discuss the potential remaining reasons for high discount-
ing, and the implications of these findings for designing
more effective interventions to reduce discounting.
In an online survey (Experiment 1), only half of the
responders spontaneously referred to opportunity costs—
interest rates, investments, etc.—as a factor to be consid-
ered when making intertemporal choices. The other half
of the responders, then, did not mention the most impor-
tant consideration from a normative point of view. Of
those who did refer to opportunity costs, about a third
were high discounters, suggesting that many who men-
tioned this strategy may not have been using it appropri-
ately. These results suggest that many people are unaware
of the normative strategy or how it applies to this task, and
that some who try to apply the normative strategy do so
inappropriately, perhaps because of incorrect estimates of
interest rates.
To examine whether addressing these knowledge gaps
would reduce discounting, the next experiment (Experi-
ment 2) tested the effects of learning about the normative
strategy and/or about interest rates. People who learned
about the normative strategy and how to apply it to the
task exhibited lower discount rates, suggesting that not all
subjects could (or did) apply the normative strategy spon-
taneously. This reduction in discounting was not tempo-
rary, and lasted for at least a month. However, although
discounting was significantly reduced, observed discount
rates were still very impatient relative to market inter-
est rates. As demonstrated in Experiment 3, even using
strong prescriptive language and providing simple heuris-
tics, which made the normative strategy clear, did not re-
duce discount rates to the level of market interest rates.
Finally, Experiment 4 compared the effect of the norma-
tive argument to that of other arguments. Arguments that
referenced normatively relevant factors (financial oppor-
tunity costs) and those encouraging subjects to engage in
episodic future thought were similarly effective at chang-
ing discount rates. Normative arguments, while perhaps
not being any more effective than other arguments, are at
least not any less effective. It was also possible to con-
vince people to become more impatient, even when refer-
encing financial opportunity costs. However, arguments
in favor of greater patience resulted in shifts that were
proportionally larger and more reliable.
Two previous studies reported results related to these
findings. Coller and Williams (1999) showed that pro-
viding APY comparisons between available market op-
tions and the choices in the experiment decreased dis-
count rates by 30%. Similarly, Read et al. (2005) found
that framing choices as between taking a smaller amount
of money now or investing it at a given interest rate re-
duced discount rates by up to 57%. Here we did not show
the APR of each choice, but rather provided examples of
different APRs as part of an explicit normative argument
about why rates of return should be relevant to the dis-
counting task. In addition, discount rates were measured
both immediately after subjects were given this informa-
tion as well as one month later, to determine whether
any observed changes were lasting. Across three exper-
iments, we found similar or steeper reductions in dis-
counting (35–85%) than Coller and Williams (1999) and
Read et al. (2005), and demonstrated that these reductions
persisted (at 23–61%) for at least one month.
Though providing normative instruction did reduce
discount rates, even with the strongest possible wording
in Experiment 3, discount rates still remained above mar-
ket interest rates. This set of experiments quantifies how
much lack of knowledge about the normative argument
contributes to high discount rates. There are several other
possible contributing factors to high discount rates, which
remain to be further explored and quantified. While the
simplest explanation might be that subjects simply ignore
normative considerations, it is worth also considering po-
tential normative reasons for the continued high rates of
discounting.
One possibility is that subjects felt that the future pay-
ment was associated with some degree of inherent risk
(Benzion et al., 1989; Keren & Roleofsma, 1995; Das-
gupta & Maskin, 2005; Bommier, 2006; Halevy, 2008;
Gerber & Rohde, 2010). If subjects did not trust that
they would receive the delayed payment from the experi-
menter, whether due to a default on the part of the exper-
imenter or some other unexpected event, then they would
be justified in demanding a greater rate of return. How-
ever, in Experiment 1 we saw that only 16% of responders
spontaneously mentioned risk as a consideration in their
choices. Additionally, if risk were a factor in increasing
discount rates, we would have expected a difference in
discount rates at the month time point between subjects
who had already received a delayed payment and those
who had not. This was tested in Experiment 2, and no ef-
fect was apparent. Risk considerations alone do not seem
to be able to account for the high levels of discounting
that remained in our experiments.
Another possibility is that subjects may have been
credit-constrained. The expectation that discount rates
should be near market interest rates assumes that subjects
have borrowing opportunities available. It seems unlikely
that this would not be the case in the university under-
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graduate population that we tested. The most likely major
source of credit for these subjects is a credit card. Tak-
ing into account possible penalties and late fees, the in-
terest rates on credit cards could approach 50% annually,
which is close to the median discount rate we observed
immediately after subjects read the guide in Experiment
3. Discount rates in Experiments 2 and 4 were larger this,
though. So credit constraints alone seem unlikely to ac-
count for the high levels of discounting that remained in
our experiments.
A third possibility is that subjects could have expected
their baseline levels of consumption to have increased by
the end of the delay period, making the future reward rel-
atively less valuable (Frederick et al., 2002, Gerber & Ro-
hde, 2010). Rather than being impatient, then, subjects
were being (overly) optimistic. This possibility merits
some consideration, though it is unclear why many of our
subjects (university students) would have expected a large
change in consumption in such a short timeframe (at most
six months).
A final possibility is that subjects faced transaction
costs in implementing the normative strategy. Subjects
might have perceived borrowing money from another
source to require a greater amount of effort (for example,
remembering their credit bill, not losing the experiment
payment card over the course of several months, etc.) and
felt that this additional effort was not worth the marginal
gain in earnings. If there were transaction costs, subjects
could have been licensed to discount according to when
they wanted to consume. This explanation would predict
that subjects would be more likely to move towards the
normative strategy for larger monetary amounts, since the
marginal gain would then outweigh any transaction costs.
Future research should test this possibility.
The considerations described above are all normative
reasons why subjects might continue to discount at a high
rate. However, it is also possible that subjects in our ex-
periments simply ignored normative considerations alto-
gether, or weighed them along with other factors. These
other factors might suggest different interventions from
the ones used here, which might prove more successful at
changing discount rates. Two other potential factors are
concreteness and perceived temporal distance.
The way people consider time-money tradeoffs could
be affected by the relative concreteness of the present ver-
sus the future (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Malkoc & Za-
uberman, 2006; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). Immediate
events tend to be more concrete, more tangible, and eas-
ier to imagine, while delayed events tend to be more ab-
stract, more intangible, and harder to imagine. This sug-
gests that manipulations that change the way people con-
strue future events could change discount rates, if these
make the receipt of future payments more tangible. The
“prospective” arguments in Experiment 4 provide an ex-
ample of one way to manipulate the tangibility of the
future. The prospective argument encouraging patience
described potential future situations in which individuals
would enjoy having an additional amount of money, or re-
gret having accepted a smaller amount of money sooner.
Peters and Büchel (2010) also found that increasing
the tangibility of the future reduced discount rates. In
their study, intertemporal choices were accompanied by
a reference to an event the subject had planned for that
date (e.g., “vacationing in Paris”). They observed a mod-
est decrease (22%) in discount rates when future reward
dates were accompanied by a reference to a discrete fu-
ture event.
Another potential factor is perceived temporal dis-
tance. People who perceive the future reward as closer
should be more patient than those that perceive it as far-
ther away. Kim (2010) manipulated temporal distance by
having subjects read facts framed to reduce (“the aver-
age lifespan is 80 years”) or enhance (“the human brain
begins to deteriorate at age 40”) the relative temporal dis-
tance to a delayed reward. Those in the latter condition
discounted at a significantly higher rate.
However, while manipulations of tangibility or per-
ceived temporal distance do affect discount rates, none of
these effects are larger than those we demonstrated here
with normative arguments. An important question for fu-
ture research is whether combining different kinds of ar-
guments or tailoring arguments to specific individuals re-
sults in any larger effects on discounting, since normative
information is not the entire solution.
Another important question for future research is how
generalizable the effects we observed are. Although not
complete reductions, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate
that the effects we observed persist on the same experi-
mental task for at least a month. But would similar ma-
nipulations also affect behavior outside the laboratory en-
vironment? Would these effects transfer from a discount-
ing task to other decision contexts where interest rates or
opportunity costs are normatively relevant (such as a con-
sumer’s decision whether to purchase an more expensive
yet energy-efficient appliance)?
One potential concern is the extent to which our re-
sults might be affected by experimenter demand effects
(Nichols & Maner, 2008). Throughout these experi-
ments, we took systematic measures to mitigate this con-
cern. First, our subjects were motivated to reveal their
true preferences, since the choices in all of our experi-
ments were incentive-compatible and had real monetary
consequences, which were substantial relative to typical
subject payments. If subjects were changing their behav-
ior based on expectations alone, they were “paying” to
do so. Further, in Experiment 2, the financial guide was
carefully written to not privilege patient shifts over im-
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patient shifts. It focused on how subjects should think
about their choices rather than what they should choose.
In Experiment 4, the arguments were explicitly labeled
as being generated by other subjects. Subjects knew that
there were multiple experimental conditions and that the
experimenter was blinded to their condition assignment,
so it was more difficult to infer what the experimenter
expected in each condition. Demand effects might be a
factor in Experiment 3. However, the primary aim of Ex-
periment 3 was to examine whether the strongest possi-
ble manipulation could reduce discount rates to the level
of market interest rates, regardless of the reason for this
shift. It is noteworthy that even here, despite the clear rec-
ommendations made in the guide, subjects did not follow
either of the choice rules that were explicitly suggested to
them.
In the field, there is inconsistent evidence about the ef-
fectiveness of financial education, including attempts to
encourage retirement savings in the workplace and efforts
to impart general financial knowledge to high school and
college students (Bernheim, 2003; Clark & d’Ambrosio,
2003; Mandell, 2006; Borden et al., 2007; Martin, 2007).
Although many studies report that financial education
changes people’s intentions regarding spending or invest-
ing, fewer studies are able to measure whether altered in-
tentions do actually carry through to changes in behavior
(Choi et al., 2004; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Lusardi,
2008). Several authors claim that given the inconsistent
evidence and high cost, financial education should not
be continued in its current forms; however, reviews of
the topic note greater success when interventions are tar-
geted to a very specific behavior and point in time (Fox et
al., 2005; Hathaway & Khatiwada, 2008; Lusardi, 2008;
Mandell & Klein, 2009; Willis, 2008). Interventions like
ours, that address a specific type of choice immediately
before people make those choices, are among the more
successful.
It will undoubtedly disappoint and surprise some that
providing normative arguments did not reduce discount
rates to the level of market interest rates. However, nor-
mative arguments did induce changes that are at least as
large, if not larger, than those seen with other manipula-
tions. Given these findings, efforts to reduce discounting
should not ignore normative instruction, though more ef-
fective interventions might combine normative and other
arguments, or tailor arguments to the specific individ-
ual. On a practical level, the type of manipulation tested
here may prove useful, even if the effects are time- and
context-limited. Many financial decisions, such as allo-
cating retirement funds or taking out a loan, are made
largely at one point in time, and are already subject to the
social influences of experts. Changing the information
and advice provided at the time of these choices can have
profound practical impacts on decision-making.
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1. Experiment 2—Financial guide
How do you decide which option you prefer?
There are several things you might think about when
deciding whether you prefer to receive a larger amount of
money in the future or a smaller amount of money now.
However, most financial advisors would recommend that
you also consider your other financial opportunities when
making these decisions. They would say that the best
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choice for you will depend on what other opportunities
you have.
Maybe you want to spend money today. Then, if given
a choice between $20 now and $30 in a month, you might
want to accept the $20 now because you would prefer to
spend the money right away. On the other hand, maybe
you want to make the most money possible in the experi-
ment. In this case, if given a choice between $20 now and
$20.50 in a year, you might want to accept the $20.50 in
a year because you would prefer to receive the largest
amount of money.
Both of these possible goals—to spend money today
and to make the most money possible – might be achieved
in more profitable ways if you also considered the finan-
cial opportunities available to you outside of the experi-
ment. That is, if you have other opportunities, you might
be able to spend more money now without taking the
smaller, immediate option in the experiment. Similarly, if
you have other opportunities, you might be able to make
more money overall without taking the larger, later pay-
ment.
You can borrow or invest money in several different
ways.
In this experiment, you can think about each choice as
a potential loan or investment. Choosing the smaller, im-
mediate payment over the larger, delayed option is com-
parable to taking out a loan—to obtain a smaller amount
of money now, you forfeit a larger amount of money later.
Likewise, choosing the larger, delayed payment over the
smaller, immediate option is comparable to making an
investment—to obtain a larger amount of money later,
you give up a smaller amount of money now.
Outside of the experiment, you might have other ways
of borrowing and investing money. You could borrow
money by using your credit card, getting a loan from your
bank, or asking a friend for money. You could invest
money by putting it in a savings account, purchasing a
certificate-of-deposit, or buying stocks and bonds.
You can use interest rates to compare the choices in
this experiment to your other financial opportunities.
An economist or financial advisor would recommend
that you compare the opportunities offered in this exper-
iment to the other opportunities available to you outside
the experiment. You may know the interest rates that you
pay on your other loans or that you earn on your other in-
vestments. To compare your choices in this experiment to
your options outside the experiment, then, you can think
about these choices in terms of interest rates.
The graph below might help you do this. Both borrow-
ing and investing involve interest rates in a similar way.
Each line shows, for a different interest rate, the increas-
ing value of $20 if borrowed or invested at that rate for
different lengths of time.
When you borrow money, you accumulate interest on
the amount you borrowed until you repay the loan. One
way to use this graph is to think of each line as show-
ing how the amount of money you would have to repay
after borrowing $20 grows over time. For example, the
red line shows that if you borrowed $20 for a year at an
annual interest rate of 20% (compounded monthly), you
would have to pay back $24.39 at the end of the year.
Choosing $20 now over $24.39 in a year, therefore, is
like borrowing money at a 20% annual interest rate.
Likewise, when you invest money, you earn interest on
your deposit until you withdraw the money. Another way
to use the graph is to think of each line as showing how
the amount of money you would earn by investing $20
grows over time. For example, the green line shows that
if you invested $20 for a year at an annual interest rate of
10% (compounded monthly), you would receive $22.09
at the end of the year. Choosing $22.09 in a year over
$20 now, then, is like investing money at a 10% annual
interest rate.
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You can “have it both ways.”
You can use interest rates to compare the choices in
this experiment to your other financial opportunities. This
comparison is important, because if your other financial
opportunities are better, then you can “have it both ways”
in this experiment.
Returning to our previous two examples will make
this concrete. What if you really want to spend money
now? Having other borrowing opportunities means that
you could take the larger, delayed payment and still en-
joy spending money right away. Given a choice between
$20 now and $30 in a month, you could simply accept the
smaller, immediate option and spend the money today.
However, this would be like borrowing money at a high
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 5, September 2012 Reducing delay discounting 587
annual interest rate of 600%. You might have a credit
card with a lower annual interest rate of 20%. If you do,
instead of choosing to receive $20 now, you could choose
$30 in a month, and still spend $20 today by charging
it on your credit card. Then, when you receive the $30
from the experiment, you could pay off the charge on
your credit card. At this point, you would still have an
additional amount ($9.70) left over. Notice that this way
you get what you want—spending the money today—and
also gain additional money that you would not have had
if you chose the immediate option.
Alternatively, what if you really want to make the most
money possible? Having other investment opportunities
means that you could take the smaller, immediate pay-
ment and still get a larger amount of money later. Given a
choice between $20 now and $20.50 in a year, you might
want to accept the $20.50 in a year because you prefer to
receive the larger amount of money. However, this would
be like investing money at a low annual interest rate of
2.5%. You might have a savings account that earns a
higher annual interest rate of 5%. If you do, instead of
choosing $20.50 in a year, you could choose $20 now,
and put that money in your savings account. Then, in a
year, you would have $21.02. At this point, you would
have the $20.50 that you originally wanted, plus an addi-
tional amount ($0.52). Notice that this allows you to get
what you want—the larger amount of money—and also
earn additional money that you would not have had if you
chose the delayed option.
Consider your opportunities for borrowing and invest-
ment.
All of this advice depends on your financial situation.
You might not have a credit card or other convenient ways
to borrow money. Even if you do have a credit card, you
may have reached your credit limit or be behind on your
payments. You might not have a bank account that earns
interest, or other convenient ways to invest money. Ob-
viously, if you don’t have these other opportunities, then
you can’t use them in the ways suggested above.
This means that you might make decisions that people
with different opportunities might not necessarily make.
If you want money to spend today, and you do not have
any other borrowing opportunities, then you might accept
a smaller, sooner option that other people would reject. If
you want the greatest amount of money, and you do not
have any other investment opportunities, then you might
accept a larger, later option that other people would reject.
Everyone is different.
Everyone will come into this experiment with a dif-
ferent financial situation. For some, considering your
other opportunities might lead you to choose the larger,
later option more frequently. For others, considering your
other opportunities might lead you to choose the smaller,
immediate option more often.
Choose what is best for you.
If you think these are good recommendations for you,
then you should consider your other financial opportu-
nities when making decisions in this experiment. Re-
member that you will be paid according to the choice
you make on one randomly selected trial, so you should
choose the option on every trial that you think is truly best
for you.
2. Experiment 3—Prescriptive financial
guide
You are more impatient than most participants.
When given the choice between receiving a smaller
amount of money sooner or a larger amount of money
later, you usually choose to receive the money as soon as
possible. Most participants in our experiments are more
patient—they are more willing to wait for larger amounts
of money.
Your impatience is costing you money.
Because you usually choose to receive the money as
soon as possible, you are likely to earn less money than
other participants. You would receive the most money
from us, of course, if you chose the larger amount of
money regardless of the delay.
Any expert would tell you that there is a single best
strategy in this experiment.
If you were to ask any expert—for example, an
economist, someone working in business, or a financial
advisor—all of them would tell you that there is a sin-
gle best strategy in this experiment. Since the choices in
our experiment involve money, which can be invested or
borrowed, there is a way to definitively determine which
option best achieves your goals.
The simple version of the best strategy is to always ac-
cept the larger amount of money.
As you will read below, any expert would advise you to
accept the larger amount of money, as long as it is worth
more than what the immediately available amount would
be after investing it over the delay. Since this will almost
always be the case with our delayed offers, a simple rule
that is very close to the best strategy would be to choose
the larger amount of money, regardless of the delay.
The sophisticated version of the best strategy takes into
account the rate of return that you could earn on invest-
ments.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 5, September 2012 Reducing delay discounting 588
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
20
22
24
26
28
30
Time Money is Borrowed/Invested (Months)
To
ta
l V
al
ue
 o
f M
on
ey
 ($
)
Increasing Value of $20 Borrowed/Invested at 
Different Interest Rates
 
 
40% APR
20% APR
10% APR
2.5% APR
How should you decide which is the more valuable op-
tion in our experiment? If you were to ask any expert,
they would tell you that you should approach this deci-
sion by thinking about how much the immediate payment
would be worth in the future if invested at some interest
rate during the given delay. If the immediate option plus
the interest from its investment is larger than the delayed
option, then it is the better choice; if the delayed option
is larger than the immediate option plus interest, then it is
the more valuable option.
Consider the example of choosing between $20 today
and a larger amount of money in a year. If you were
to accept the offer of $20 and invest it at the very high
compounding interest rate of 20% per year, you can see
from the graph that you would earn a growing amount of
interest on that money every month. At the end of the
year, the $20 that you invested originally will be worth
$24.43. If your choice were between $20 today and $21
in a year, the immediate offer would be the more valuable
one. However, if your choice were between $20 today
and $25 (or anything greater) in a year, the later amount
would more valuable. Since you will probably not be able
to find such a high, profitable interest rate, and since we
are usually offering you much larger delayed sums than
those in the graph, you are almost always better off taking
the larger, delayed option in our experiment.
The best strategy lets you “have it both ways.”
But what if you really wanted $20 today, rather than
$25 in a year? You are still better off following the best
strategy. In this case, you should borrow the $20 from
another source, and wait for the $25 we would pay you
in a year, rather than foregoing the larger offer and taking
the $20 today from us. If you had enough money, you
could “borrow” $20 from your bank account at 0% inter-
est. If not, you could borrow money from another source,
for example, by taking a cash advance from a credit card.
Credit cards tend to have high interest rates, up to 20%
per year. Even at this high rate, though, you could borrow
$20 from your card to spend today and only owe $4.38 of
interest in a year. So you could borrow $20 today and
spend it, then pay off your credit card when you receive
the $25 from us a year from now, and still have some extra
change to spare—money which you would not have had
if you took the $20 from us rather than another source.
You are not required to follow this advice—your
choices are up to you.
Although we believe that we have provided you with
the best advice possible, your selections are still up to
you. Remember that you will be paid according to the
choice you make on one randomly selected trial, so you
should choose the option on every trial that you truly
think is best.
3. Experiment 4—Peer-generated advice
paragraphs
Patient, financial reasoning
With the rate of savings accounts today, if you are given
the option of taking $20 today or $22 three months from
now, you should choose the $22 three months from now.
I know the numbers are small, but think about it this
way...would you rather have $20,000 today or $22,000
three months from now? That is a 10% return on your
money in only three months! You would not be able to
do that in the stock market very easy and that would en-
tail lots of risk! If you annualize the return, that would be
a 40% return per year! If you took the $20,000 today and
put it in a savings account, (earning about 1%) in three
months you would only have $20,050. The difference is
$1950! What would be so important that you would need
to have money today and can’t wait just a few months
down the road to get even MORE money. The percent-
ages are the same for the lower numbers. The amounts
are guaranteed, so just take the later payment. Resist the
urge to take the money today, delay your gratification and
get more in the future!
Patient, prospective thought
You might as well wait to get the money. It’s like putting
money in the bank. Sometimes you can’t touch the
money for a certain period of time, but you will have
more in the long run because of the interest gained. Just
pretend the money isn’t there at all. You will be glad you
did when you are paid at the end of a few weeks. The
money may come in handy when you really need it if you
save it--to pay bills or save for something you’ve been
wanting. If you get it now, you will probably just spend
it on something you don’t really need, like going out to
a restaurant or buying something frivolous that you’ll re-
gret later. It is much better to have patience and earn a
better reward than to enjoy a small amount now. Also,
what it comes down to is that you get less money! Why
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would you settle for less today if you could simply wait
a while and have much more? For example, if I were
to receive $15 today rather than $30 in a month, I could
spend the $15 on dinner for myself. But if I were to wait,
I could take a friend to dinner or put it towards something
I’ve been saving for. You get more, and all you have to
do is wait. Waiting isn’t so bad.
Impatient, financial reasoning
The stock market on average grows about 10% annually.
Therefore, most of the choices there beat the average ex-
pectation of the market. However, some, like $34 now
or $35 173 days later, do not even compare with what
you could do if you invested in the market. While 10%
in finance may be a lot, in daily activities, we experi-
ence mark ups easily exceed 10%. Thus, from an en-
trepreneurial or pricing standpoint, waiting more than a
month for small return (eg $20 now, or $24 in 40 days)
would also seem excessive. Time is money, and you
could easily take the $20 and generate more than $24 in
40 days if you, for example, were able to make a cheap
product and sell to your friends (like personal birthday
cards), then you would obviously want the money now.
For larger differences, say $10 now or $15 in 10 days,
the wait is not substantial and the increase is dramatic.
In situation, it would be better to wait the 10 days to get
$15. Lastly, anything with a ridiculously long wait time
just isn’t worth it. Who would want to wait half a year
to receive money that’s only marginally more than what
they would receive today?
Impatient, prospective thought
Imagine that you are worried about paying your electric
bill, the baby sitter, the dentist for your child. The econ-
omy is tanking, half your peers have lost their jobs this
month. You may be next. You’re still there because your
hours were reduced. Someone is offering you money.
You can take an amount today or you can take somewhat
more money in a few weeks. If the payment is much
larger at a much later date, the odds of being given the
money are reduced. Your need for the money will also
be increased. Money now can be used to pay immedi-
ate needs to prevent interest charges. It can be put in
an emergency fund, something money “later” (that may
never arrive or be devalued by inflation) may not provide.
A smaller amount of money given today or in the next
few days also provides a financial cushion and a margin
of security. That cash reserve can be used to pay sudden
costs (kid to ER, car repair) that might have caused over-
draft charges on a checking account. That $20 extra today
suddenly saves $25 in overdraft charges or late fees. $35
in six months cannot equal that value.
